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Abstract
Runtime Verification (RV) is a lightweight formal technique in which program or system execution
is monitored and analyzed, to check whether certain properties are satisfied or violated after a finite
number of steps. The use of RV has led to interest in deciding whether a property is monitorable:
whether it is always possible for the satisfaction or violation of the property to be determined
after a finite future continuation. However, classical two-valued monitorability suffers from two
inherent limitations. First, a property can only be evaluated as monitorable or non-monitorable;
no information is available regarding whether only one verdict (satisfaction or violation) can be
detected. As a result, the developer may write unnecessary handlers for inactive verdicts, increasing
effort and runtime overhead. Second, monitorability is defined at the language-level and does not
tell us whether satisfaction or violation can be detected starting from the current monitor state
during system execution. As a result, every monitor object must be maintained during the entire
execution, again increasing runtime overhead.
To address these limitations, this paper proposes a new notion of four-valued monitorability for
ω-languages and applies it at the state-level. Four-valued monitorability is more informative than
two-valued monitorability as a property can be evaluated as a four-valued result, denoting that only
satisfaction, only violation, or both are active for a monitorable property. We can also compute
state-level weak monitorability, i.e., whether satisfaction or violation can be detected starting from
a given state in a monitor, which enables state-level optimizations of monitoring algorithms. Based
on a new six-valued semantics, we propose procedures for computing four-valued monitorability of
ω-regular languages, both at the language-level and at the state-level. We have developed a new
tool, Monic, that implements the proposed procedure for computing monitorability of LTL formulas.
We evaluated its effectiveness using a set of standard LTL formulas. Experimental results show that
Monic can correctly, and quickly, report both two-valued and four-valued monitorability.
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2 Four-valued monitorability of ω-regular languages
1 Introduction
Runtime Verification (RV) [32, 6, 29] is a lightweight formal technique in which program
or system execution is monitored and analyzed. RV uses information extracted from an
execution to check whether certain properties are satisfied or violated after a finite number of
steps, possibly leading to online responses, such as signaling notifications or alarms, logging,
computing statistical information, profiling, and performing error protection or recovery. In
RV, properties are usually expressed using formalisms [26] such as Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) formulas [36, 33, 17, 10], Nondeterministic Büchi Automata (NBAs), and ω-regular
expressions, which represent ω-regular languages [15, 7]. RV tools automatically synthesize
monitors (i.e., code fragments) from formal specifications and then weave the code into the
system through instrumentation [24, 28, 25]. The inserted code typically maintains a set of
monitor objects that can detect property satisfaction or violation during system execution.
Such approaches have been extended to parametric RV, in which properties are checked over
every parameter instance (i.e., a combination of parameter values) by maintaining a monitor
object for every parameter instance [11, 34, 38, 13, 12, 27].
Figure 1 shows a monitor specification, written in the Movec language [13], for the
parametric RV of an event-driven system that dispatches a variety of events (e.g., sensor status,
keystrokes, program loadings etc.) to components (e.g., libraries, mobile apps, microservices
etc.). Similar specifications can be written for other tools such as JavaMOP [11, 34] and
TraceMatches [4, 5]. This specification defines a parametric monitor, named priority, which
takes two parameters: a component ID c and an event ID e that should be instantiated
with the values (i.e., actual arguments) generated by system execution. The specification
body begins with four actions, which extract information regarding function calls that occur
during runtime: r records a component being registered to an event (it also creates a monitor
object by instantiating the monitor parameters with the arguments of the call), u records an
unregister, b records the broadcast of an event (the argument of the call) to all components,
and n records a certain component being notified of a specific event. This specification is
used to monitor system execution to check whether the property, specified as LTL formula
φ1 := (r ∧ Fu)→ ((¬b ∧ ¬u)Un)Uu, is satisfied or violated after a finite number of steps,
i.e., any infinite future continuation makes the property satisfied or violated, respectively.
The property requires that if a component c registers to an event e and unregisters later,
then before the unregister, the event e cannot be broadcasted until c has been notified (i.e.,
c has a higher priority than unregistered components in the context of receiving e).
In practice, if the satisfaction or violation of a property is detected by a monitor object
then an associated handler (i.e., a piece of code) is automatically triggered to perform some
online response [13, 11, 34]. For example, Figure 1 includes two handlers for the satisfaction
(i.e., validation) and violation of the LTL formula: if the property is satisfied then a message
is logged; if it is violated then an alarm is signaled and this prints the IDs of the component
and the event. The two handlers may also be extended to more advanced operations, e.g.,
profiling and error recovery.
We may also monitor the system against other properties, e.g., φ2 := Fr → GFn that a
component should receive notifications infinitely often after its registration, φ3 := r → Fu
that a component unregisters after its registration, and φ4 := G(r → ¬uUn) that a registered
component receives at least one notification before its deregistration. The developer may
also write handlers for the satisfaction and violation of each property.
When specifying properties, the developer is usually concerned with their monitorab-
ility [37, 10, 7, 16], i.e., after any number of steps, whether the satisfaction or violation
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monitor priority(c,e) {
creation action r(c,e) after call(% reg_component(% %:c, % %:e));
action u(c,e) after call(% unreg_component(% %:c, % %:e));
action b(e) before execution(% broadcast(% %:e));
action n(c,e) after execution(% notify(% %:c, % %:e));
ltl: (r && <>u) -> ((!b && !u) U n) U u;
@validation {
log("Priority applied: component %lu registers to event %lu.\n",
monitor->c, monitor->e);
}
@violation {
printf("Priority violated: component %lu registers to event %lu.\n",
monitor->c, monitor->e);
}
};
Figure 1 A monitor specification with an LTL formula.
of the monitored property can still be detected after a finite future continuation. When
writing handlers for these properties, the developer might consider the following question:
“Can the handlers for satisfaction and violation be triggered during system execution?” We
say that a verdict and its handler are active if there is some continuation that would lead
to the verdict being detected and thus its handler being triggered. This question can be
partly answered by deciding monitorability (with the traditional two-valued notion). For
example, φ2 (above) is non-monitorable, i.e., there is some finite sequence of steps after
which no verdict is active. Worse, φ2 is also weakly non-monitorable [14], i.e., no verdict can
be detected after any number of steps. Thus writing handlers for φ2 is a waste of time as
they will never be triggered. More seriously, monitoring φ2 at runtime adds no value but
increases runtime overhead. In contrast, φ1, φ3 and φ4 are monitorable, i.e., some verdicts
are always active. Thus their handlers must be developed as they may be triggered. However,
this answer is still unsatisfactory, as the existing notion of monitorability suffers from two
inherent limitations: limited informativeness and coarse granularity.
Limited informativeness. The existing notion of monitorability is not sufficiently in-
formative, as it is two-valued, i.e., a property can only be evaluated as monitorable or
non-monitorable. This means, for a monitorable property, we only know that some verdicts
are active, but no information is available regarding whether only one verdict (satisfaction
or violation) is active. As a result, the developer may still write unnecessary handlers for
inactive verdicts. For example, φ1, φ3 and φ4 are monitorable. We only know that at least
one of satisfaction and violation is active, but this does not tell us which ones are active and
thus which handlers are required. As a result, the developer may waste time in handling
inactive verdicts, e.g., the violation of φ3 and the satisfaction of φ4. Thus, the existing
answer is far from satisfactory.
Limited informativeness also weakens the support for property debugging. For example,
when writing a property the developer may expect that both verdicts are active but a mistake
may lead to only one verdict being active. The converse is also the case. Unfortunately, these
kinds of errors cannot be revealed by two-valued monitorability, as the expected property
and the written (erroneous) property are both monitorable. For example, the developer may
write formula φ4 while having in mind another one φ5 := r → ¬uUn, i.e., what she/he really
wants is wrongly prefixed by one G. These two formulas cannot be discriminated by deciding
two-valued monitorability as both are monitorable.
4 Four-valued monitorability of ω-regular languages
Coarse granularity. The existing notion of monitorability is defined at the language-level,
i.e., a property can only be evaluated as monitorable or non-monitorable as a whole, rather
than a notion for (more fine-grained) states in a monitor. This means that we do not know
whether satisfaction or violation can be detected starting from the current state during
system execution. As a result, every monitor object must be maintained during the entire
execution, again increasing runtime overhead. For example, φ6 := GFr ∨ (¬n → X¬b) is
weakly monitorable, thus all its monitor objects (i.e., instances of the Finite State Machine
(FSM) in Figure 2), created for every pair of component and event, are maintained.
P1
P2!n
T
n
!b
N
b
true
true
Figure 2 A monitor for LTL for-
mula φ6 := GFr ∨ (¬n → X¬b). Each
transition is labeled with a proposi-
tional formula denoting a set of satis-
fying states. For example, “!n” denotes
{∅, {r}, {b}, {r, b}} and “true” denotes
all states.
Note that parametric runtime verification is NP-
complete for detecting violations and coNP-complete
for ensuring satisfaction [12]. This high complexity
primarily comes from the large number of monitor
objects maintained for all parameter instances [34,
13, 12]. For state-level optimizations of monitoring
algorithms, if no verdict can be detected starting from
the current state of a monitor object, then the object
can be switched off and safely removed to improve
runtime performance. For example, in Figure 2, only
satisfaction can be detected starting from states P1,
P2 and T, whereas no verdict can be detected starting
from N. Thus a monitor object can be safely removed
when it enters N. Unfortunately, the existing notion does not support such optimizations.
Our Solution. In this paper, we propose a new notion of four-valued monitorability for
ω-languages, and apply it at the state-level, overcoming the two limitations discussed above.
First, the proposed approach is more informative than two-valued monitorability. Indeed,
a property can be evaluated as a four-valued result, denoting that only satisfaction, only
violation, or both are active for a monitorable property. Thus, if satisfaction (resp. violation)
is inactive, then writing handlers for satisfaction (resp. violation) is not required. This can
also enhance property debugging. For example, φ4 and φ5 can now be discriminated by
their different monitorability results, as φ4 can never be satisfied but φ5 can be satisfied
and can also be violated. Thus, additional developer mistakes can be revealed. Second, we
can compute state-level weak monitorability, i.e., whether satisfaction or violation can be
detected starting from a given state in a monitor. For example, in Figure 2, state N is weakly
non-monitorable, thus a monitor object can be safely removed when it enters state N, which
achieves a state-level optimization.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
We propose a new notion of four-valued monitorability for ω-languages (Section 3), which
provides more informative answers as to which verdicts are active. This notion is defined
using six types of prefixes, which complete the classification of finite sequences.
We propose a procedure for computing four-valued monitorability of ω-regular languages,
given in terms of LTL formulas, NBAs or ω-regular expressions (Section 4), based on a
new six-valued semantics.
We propose a new notion of state-level four-valued weak monitorability and its computa-
tion procedure for ω-regular languages (Section 5), which describes which verdicts are
active for a state. This can enable state-level optimizations of monitoring algorithms.
We have developed a new tool, Monic, that implements the proposed procedure for
computing monitorability of LTL formulas. We evaluated its effectiveness using a set of
97 LTL patterns and formulas φ1 to φ6 (above). Experimental results show that Monic
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can correctly report both two-valued and four-valued monitorability (Section 6).
2 Preliminaries
Let AP be a non-empty finite set of atomic propositions. A state is a complete assignment of
truth values to the propositions in AP . Let Σ = 2AP be a finite alphabet, i.e., the set of all
states. Σ∗ is the set of finite words (i.e., sequences of states in Σ), including the empty word
, and Σω is the set of infinite words. We denote atomic propositions by p, q, r, finite words
by u, v, and infinite words by w, unless explicitly specified. We write a finite or infinite word
in the form {p, q}{p}{q, r} · · · , where a proposition appears in a state iff it is assigned true.
We drop the brackets around singletons, i.e., {p, q}p{q, r} · · · .
An ω-language (i.e., a linear-time infinitary property) L is a set of infinite words over Σ,
i.e., L ⊆ Σω. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [36, 33] is a typical representation of ω-regular
languages. LTL extends propositional logic, which uses boolean connectives ¬ (not) and ∧
(conjunction), by introducing temporal connectives such as X (next), U (until), R (release),
F (future, or eventually) and G (globally, or always). Intuitively, Xφ says that φ holds
at the next state, φ1Uφ2 says that at some future state φ2 holds and before that state φ1
always holds. Using the temporal connectives X and U, the full power of LTL is obtained.
For convenience, we also use some common abbreviations: true, false, standard boolean
connectives φ1 ∨ φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) and φ1 → φ2 ≡ ¬φ1 ∨ φ2, and additional temporal
connectives φ1Rφ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1U¬φ2) (the dual to U), Fφ ≡ trueUφ (φ eventually holds), and
Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ (φ always holds). We denote by L(φ) the ω-language accepted by a formula φ.
Let us recall the classification of prefixes that are used to define the three-valued semantics
and two-valued monitorability of ω-languages.
I Definition 1 (Good, bad and ugly prefixes [31, 8]). A finite word u ∈ Σ∗ is a good prefix
for L if ∀w ∈ Σω.uw ∈ L, a bad prefix for L if ∀w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L, or an ugly prefix
for L if no finite extension makes it good or bad, i.e., 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L and
6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L.
In other words, good and bad prefixes satisfy and violate an ω-language in some finite number
of steps, respectively. We denote by good(L), bad(L) and ugly(L) the set of good, bad and
ugly prefixes for L, respectively. Note that they do not constitute a complete classification
of finite words. For example, any finite word of the form p · · · p is neither a good nor a bad
prefix for pUq, and also is not an ugly prefix as it can be extended to a good prefix (ended
with q) or a bad prefix (ended with ∅).
I Definition 2 (Three-valued semantics [10]). Let B3 be the set of three truth values: true
>, false ⊥ and inconclusive ?. The truth value of an ω-language L ⊆ Σω wrt. a finite word
u ∈ Σ∗, denoted by [u |= L]3, is > or ⊥ if u is a good or bad prefix for L, respectively, and ?
otherwise.
Note that the inconclusive value does not correspond to ugly prefixes. Although an ugly
prefix always leads to the inconclusive value, the converse does not hold. For example,
[p · · · p |= L(pUq)]3 = ? but p · · · p is not an ugly prefix.
Bauer et al. [10] presented a monitor construction procedure that transforms an LTL
formula φ into a three-valued monitor, i.e., a deterministic FSM that contains >, ⊥ and ?
states, which output >, ⊥ and ? after reading over good, bad and other prefixes respectively.
For example, in Figure 2, state T is a > state, whereas the remaining states are all ? states.
The construction procedure first creates two NBAs for φ and ¬φ. For each NBA, a state
q is marked by > if the language of the NBA starting in q is not empty. The two NBAs
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are then converted into two Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFAs) whose accepting
states are those marked by >. The two NFAs are subsequently converted into two equivalent
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFAs) Aφ and A¬φ using a standard determinization,
e.g., the power-set construction. The procedure finally obtains the deterministic FSM by
computing and minimizing the product of the two DFAs. A state of the FSM outputs > if it
does not contain an accepting state of A¬φ, ⊥ if it does not contain an accepting state of Aφ,
or ? otherwise. Note that each NBA is exponentially larger than the corresponding formula,
and each DFA is exponentially larger than the corresponding NBA. Thus, this construction
procedure requires 2ExpSpace. This construction procedure can be adapted to construct
monitors for the ω-regular languages specified as NBAs and ω-regular expressions with the
same complexity.
It has been shown that the three-valued monitor can be used to compute the truth value
of an ω-language wrt. a finite word [10], which is the output of the corresponding monitor
after reading over this word.
I Lemma 3. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B3, λ3) be a three-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω, where Q is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, δ : Q × Σ 7→ Q is a
transition function, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, B3 is an output alphabet and λ3 : Q→ B3 is
an output function. For any u ∈ Σ∗, [u |= L]3 = λ3(δ(q0, u)).
I Definition 4 (Two-valued monitorability [37, 10, 7]). An ω-language L ⊆ Σω is
u-monitorable for u ∈ Σ∗, if ∃v ∈ Σ∗, s.t. uv is a good or bad prefix.
monitorable if it is u-monitorable for every u ∈ Σ∗.
In other words, L is u-monitorable if u has a good or bad extension. L is monitorable if every
finite word has a good or bad extension. Note that an ugly prefix can never be extended to
a good or bad prefix. Thus, L is non-monitorable iff there exists an ugly prefix for L.
3 Four-valued monitorability
In this section, we propose a new notion of four-valued monitorability, to provide more
informative answers to monitorability checking. As we promised, it can indicate whether
only satisfaction, only violation, or both are active for a monitorable property. Two-valued
monitorability cannot achieve this because its definition only requires that all finite words
(i.e., u in Definition 4) can be extended to good or bad prefixes (which witness satisfaction
or violation, respectively), but does not discriminate them on the types and number of the
verdicts that the extensions of each finite word can witness. To address this limitation, our
approach aims to discriminate accordingly these finite words by inspecting which types of
prefixes they can be extended to.
To achieve this objective, we first need to propose a new classification of prefixes, as
the traditional classification (as the good, the bad and the ugly) is not satisfactory due
to incompleteness, i.e., it does not include the finite words that are neither good nor bad
but can be extended to good or bad prefixes. Thus we introduce the notions of positive,
negative and neutral prefixes, in addition to good, bad and ugly prefixes, to complete the
classification.
I Definition 5 (Positive, negative and neutral prefixes). A finite word u ∈ Σ∗ is a
positive prefix for L if it is not good, but some finite extension makes it good but never
bad, i.e., ∃w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L, ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L, and 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L,
negative prefix for L if it is not bad, but some finite extension makes it bad but never good,
i.e., ∃w ∈ Σω.uw ∈ L, ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L, and 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L, or
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neutral prefix for L if some finite extension makes it good and some makes it bad, i.e.,
∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L and ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L.
We denote by posi(L), nega(L) and neut(L) the set of positive, negative and neutral prefixes
for L, respectively. It is easy to see that the three new sets of prefixes and the three traditional
sets of good, bad and ugly prefixes are mutually disjoint. An interesting fact, as shown by
the following theorem, is that the six sets of prefixes exactly constitute the complete set of
finite words. Furthermore, the six types of prefixes directly correspond to the six-valued
semantics (cf. Definition 7). This completes the classification of prefixes.
I Theorem 6. good(L) ∪ bad(L) ∪ posi(L) ∪ nega(L) ∪ neut(L) ∪ ugly(L) = Σ∗.
The traditional three-valued semantics can identify only good and bad prefixes with the
truth values > and ⊥ respectively, whereas all the prefixes of the other four types are given
the same value ?. To discriminate them, we further divide the value ? into four truth values.
I Definition 7 (Six-valued semantics). Let B6 be the set of six truth values: true >, false ⊥,
possibly true ∓, possibly false ±, possibly conclusive + and inconclusive ×. The truth value
of an ω-language L ⊆ Σ∗ wrt. a finite word u ∈ Σ∗, denoted by [u |= L]6, is >, ⊥, ∓, ±, +
or × if u is a good, bad, positive, negative, neutral or ugly prefix for L, respectively.
Note that the six-valued semantics models a rigorous correspondence between truth values
and prefix types. Unlike the three-valued semantics, the inconclusive value now exactly
corresponds to ugly prefixes.
The six-valued semantics is closely related to the types of extensions. That is, an ω-
language is evaluated wrt. a finite word, which is neither good nor bad, as possibly true if
the word can be extended to a good prefix but never a bad prefix, possibly false if the word
can be extended to a bad prefix but never a good prefix, possibly conclusive if the word can
be extended to both good and bad prefixes, or inconclusive if neither. Thus, the six-valued
semantics can be used to evaluate whether a finite word can be extended to witness the
satisfaction and violation of an ω-language: Satisfaction is possible iff the ω-language is
evaluated wrt. the finite word as true, possibly true or possibly conclusive, while violation is
possible iff the ω-language is evaluated wrt. the finite word as false, possibly false or possibly
conclusive.
The definition of four-valued monitorability is built on the following notion of four-valued
u-monitorability which is used to discriminate finite words by inspecting which types of
prefixes they can be extended to.
I Definition 8 (Four-valued u-monitorability). An ω-language L ⊆ Σω is
weakly positively u-monitorable for u ∈ Σ∗, if ∃v ∈ Σ∗, s.t. uv is a good prefix.
weakly negatively u-monitorable for u ∈ Σ∗, if ∃v ∈ Σ∗, s.t. uv is a bad prefix.
positively u-monitorable if it is weakly positively, but not weakly negatively, u-monitorable.
(u has only good extensions, thus u is a good or positive prefix.)
negatively u-monitorable if it is weakly negatively, but not weakly positively, u-monitorable.
(u has only bad extensions, thus u is a bad or negative prefix.)
neutrally u-monitorable if it is both weakly positively and weakly negatively u-monitorable.
(u has both good and bad extensions, thus u is a neutral prefix.)
not u-monitorable if it is neither weakly positively nor weakly negatively u-monitorable.
(u has neither good nor bad extension, thus u is an ugly prefix.)
In other words, the traditional u-monitorability is split into two parts, i.e., weakly positive
and weakly negative u-monitorability. As a result, L is u-monitorable iff L is positively,
negatively or neutrally u-monitorable.
8 Four-valued monitorability of ω-regular languages
I Definition 9 (Four-valued monitorability). An ω-language L ⊆ Σω is
positively monitorable if it is positively u-monitorable for every u ∈ Σ∗.
negatively monitorable if it is negatively u-monitorable for every u ∈ Σ∗.
neutrally monitorable if it is u-monitorable for every u ∈ Σ∗, and is neutrally -
monitorable for the empty word .
non-monitorable if it is not u-monitorable for some u ∈ Σ∗.
In other words, the set of monitorable ω-languages is divided into three classes, i.e., positively,
negatively and neutrally monitorable ones. Note that the definition of neutral monitorability
consists of two conditions, of which the first ensures that L is monitorable while the second
ensures that both of satisfaction and violation can be detected after some finite sequences of
steps. We denote the four truth values (positively, negatively, neutrally and non-monitorable)
by M>, M⊥, M+ and M×, respectively.
We can validate that four-valued monitorability indeed provides the informativeness we
require, as described in Section 1, by showing the following theorem, that the truth values
M>, M⊥, and M+ indicate that only satisfaction, only violation, and both can be detected
after some finite sequences of steps, respectively. This theorem can be proved by Definitions
9 and 8, in which u is substituted by the empty word .
I Theorem 10. If an ω-language L ⊆ Σω is
positively monitorable then ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw ∈ L and 6 ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L.
negatively monitorable then ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L and 6 ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw ∈ L.
neutrally monitorable then ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw ∈ L and ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L.
Proof. Let us show the first proposition. (1) If L is positively monitorable then L is positively
-monitorable by Definition 9, which implies ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.vw ∈ L by Definition 8. (2)
Suppose ∃u ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uw 6∈ L. Thus L is not positively -monitorable by Definition 8,
which implies L is not positively monitorable by Definition 9. A contradiction.
The second and third propositions can be shown similarly. J
Let us consider some simple but essential examples regarding basic temporal connectives.
More examples, such as the formulas used in Section 1, will be considered in Section 6.
Formula Fp is positively monitorable, as any finite word can be extended to a good prefix
(ended with p) but never a bad prefix. This means that only satisfaction, but no violation,
of the property can be detected after some finite sequences of steps.
Formula Gp is negatively monitorable, as any finite word can be extended to a bad
prefix (ended with ∅) but never a good prefix. This means that only violation, but no
satisfaction, of the property can be detected after some finite sequences of steps.
Formula pUq is neutrally monitorable, as it is monitorable and  (more generally, any
finite word of the form p · · · p) can be extended to both a good prefix (ended with q) and
a bad prefix (ended with ∅). This means that both of satisfaction and violation of the
property can be detected after some finite sequences of steps.
Formula GFp is non-monitorable, as any finite word can never be extended to a good or
bad prefix, due to the infinite continuations ∅∅ · · · and pp · · · respectively. This means
that neither satisfaction nor violation of the property can be detected.
4 Computing four-valued monitorability of ω-regular languages
In this section, we propose a procedure for computing the four-valued monitorability of
ω-regular languages, based on the six-valued semantics.
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The first step is a monitor construction procedure that transforms an LTL formula into
a six-valued monitor, i.e., a deterministic FSM which outputs >, ⊥, ∓, ±, + and × after
reading over good, bad, positive, negative, neutral and ugly prefixes respectively. For example,
in Figure 2, states P1, P2 and N are all ? states under the three-valued semantics. After
refining the output function with the six-valued semantics, states P1 and P2 become ∓ states,
whereas state N becomes a × state.
The construction procedure first constructs a three-valued monitor, using the traditional
approach which requires 2ExpSpace [10]. Then we refine its output function, assigning new
outputs to ? states. Specifically, our procedure traverses all the states in the monitor, and
for each state, starts another nested traversal to check whether a > state or a ⊥ state is
reachable. A ? state is assigned output ∓ if > states are reachable but no ⊥ state is, ± if ⊥
states are reachable but no > state is, + if both > and ⊥ states are reachable, or × if neither
is reachable. This refinement step can be done in polynomial time and NLSpace (using the
three-valued monitor as the input). Thus, constructing a six-valued monitor requires also
2ExpSpace. Let us formalize the above construction procedure.
I Definition 11. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B3, λ3) be a three-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. The corresponding six-valued monitor M ′ = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) is obtained by
refining the output function λ3 of M as shown in Figure 3.
for any q ∈ Q,λ(q) =

>, if λ3(q) = >
⊥, if λ3(q) = ⊥
∓, if

λ3(q) 6= >
∃v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ ∧ λ3(q′) = >, and
∀v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ → λ3(q′) 6= ⊥
±, if

λ3(q) 6= ⊥
∃v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ ∧ λ3(q′) = ⊥, and
∀v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ → λ3(q′) 6= >
+, if
{ ∃v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ ∧ λ3(q′) = >, and
∃v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ ∧ λ3(q′) = ⊥
×, if
{ ∀v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ → λ3(q′) 6= >, and
∀v ∈ Σ∗. δ(q, v) = q′ → λ3(q′) 6= ⊥
Figure 3 The output function λ.
We can show the following lemma, that the six-valued monitor can be used to compute
the truth value of an ω-language wrt. a finite word. This lemma can be proved by Definitions
7 and 2, Lemma 3 and Definition 11.
I Lemma 12. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. For any u ∈ Σ∗, [u |= L]6 = λ(δ(q0, u)).
As a property of the six-valued monitor, the following theorem shows that each state in a
monitor can be reached by exactly one type of prefixes (by Lemma 12 and Definition 7).
I Theorem 13. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. For a state q ∈ Q, λ(q) equals >, ⊥, ∓, ±, + or ×, iff it can be reached by good,
bad, positive, negative, neutral or ugly prefixes, respectively.
Based on the six-valued monitor, the second step determines the four-valued monitorability
of an ω-language L by checking whether its monitor has some specific reachable states. The
monitorability of L is M> iff neither × nor ⊥ states are reachable (thus neither ± nor +
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states are reachable), M⊥ iff neither × nor > states are reachable (thus neither ∓ nor +
states are reachable), M+ iff no × state is reachable but a + state is reachable (thus both >
and ⊥ states are reachable), and M× iff a × state is reachable. These rules can be formalized:
I Theorem 14. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. The monitorability of L:
η(L) =

M>, iff ∀u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ → λ(q′) 6= × ∧ λ(q′) 6= ⊥
M⊥, iff ∀u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ → λ(q′) 6= × ∧ λ(q′) 6= >
M+, iff
{ ∀u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ → λ(q′) 6= ×, and
∃u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ ∧ λ(q′) = +
M×, iff ∃u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ ∧ λ(q′) = ×
Proof. (⇐) This implication can be proved by Lemma 12 (converting λ(q′) into [u |= L]6),
Definitions 7 and 9 (matching [u |= L]6 to monitorability).
For example, let us show the first case. Suppose ∀u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q′ → λ(q′) 6= ×
∧ λ(q′) 6= ⊥. Lemma 12 ensures that δ(q0, u) must be defined for every u and [u |= L]6 =
λ(δ(q0, u)). Thus ∀u ∈ Σ∗. [u |= L]6 6= × ∧ [u |= L]6 6= ⊥. Note that ∀u ∈ Σ∗. [u |= L]6 6= ±
∧ [u |= L]6 6= + (otherwise, ∃v ∈ Σ∗. [uv |= L]6 = ⊥ by Definition 7, a contradiction). As a
result, ∀u ∈ Σ∗. [u |= L]6 ∈ {>,∓}. Thus η(L) = M> by Definitions 7 and 9.
(⇒) This implication follows by the converse of the above reasoning. J
The above checking procedure can be done in linear time and NLSpace by traversing all
the states of monitor. However, note that this procedure is performed after constructing
the monitor. Thus, when an ω-regular language L is given in terms of an LTL formula, the
four-valued monitorability of L can be computed in 2ExpSpace; the same complexity as
for two-valued monitorability. As we will see in Section 6, the small size of standard LTL
patterns means that four-valued monitorability can be computed in very little time
Now consider other representations of ω-regular languages. If L is given in terms of an
NBA, we first explicitly complement the NBA, and the rest of the procedure stays the same.
However, the complement operation also involves an exponential blowup. If L is given in
terms of an ω-regular expression, we first build an NBA for the expression, which can be done
in polynomial time, and the rest of the procedure is the same as for NBA. Hence, independent
of the concrete representation, four-valued monitorability of an ω-regular language can be
computed in 2ExpSpace, by using the monitor-based procedure.
5 State-level four-valued monitorability
In this section, we apply four-valued monitorability at the state-level, to predict whether
satisfaction and violation can be detected starting from a given state in a monitor. Recall
that the notions of monitorability (cf. Definitions 4 and 9) are defined using the extensions to
good and bad prefixes. However, good and bad prefixes are defined for an ω-language, not for
a state. Thus such definitions cannot be directly applied at the state-level. Instead, we define
state-level monitorability using the reachability of > and ⊥ states, which are equivalent
notions to good and bad prefixes according to Theorem 13.
I Definition 15 (State-level four-valued monitorability). Let M = (Q,Σ, δ, q0,B6, λ) be a
six-valued monitor. A state q ∈ Q is
positively monitorable if a > state but no ⊥ state is reachable from q′, for every state
q′ ∈ Q reachable from q.
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negatively monitorable if a ⊥ state but no > state is reachable from q′, for every state
q′ ∈ Q reachable from q.
neutrally monitorable if a > state or a ⊥ state is reachable from q′, for every state q′ ∈ Q
reachable from q, and both a > state and a ⊥ state are reachable from q.
non-monitorable if neither > states nor ⊥ states are reachable from q′, for some state
q′ ∈ Q reachable from q.
Note that the above state-level monitorability is too strong to meet our requirements, because
it places restrictions on all the states reachable from the considered state q. For example,
in Figure 2, we require discriminating states P1 and P2 from state N, as satisfaction can
be detected starting from P1 and P2, but neither satisfaction nor violation can be detected
starting from N. However, P1, P2 and N are all non-monitorable as neither > states nor ⊥
states are reachable from N. To provide the required distinction, we should use a weaker form
of state-level monitorability as follows.
I Definition 16 (State-level four-valued weak monitorability). Let M = (Q,Σ, δ, q0,B6, λ) be
a six-valued monitor. A state q ∈ Q is
weakly positively monitorable if a > state but no ⊥ state is reachable from q.
weakly negatively monitorable if a ⊥ state but no > state is reachable from q.
weakly neutrally monitorable if both a > state and a ⊥ state are reachable from q.
weakly non-monitorable if neither > states nor ⊥ states are reachable from q.
A state is weakly monitorable, iff it is weakly positively, negatively or neutrally monitorable.
For example, in Figure 2, states P1, P2 and T are all weakly positively monitorable as T is a
reachable > state, while state N is weakly non-monitorable. Thus, states P1 and P2 can now
be discriminated from state N.
We can validate that state-level four-valued weak monitorability can indeed predict
whether satisfaction and violation can be detected starting from a given state, as anticipated
in Section 1, by showing the following theorem, that the truth values M>, M⊥, M+ and M×
indicate that only satisfaction, only violation, both and neither can be detected, respectively.
This theorem can be proved by Definition 16 and Theorem 13.
I Theorem 17. Let M = (Q,Σ, δ, q0,B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor. Suppose a state q ∈ Q
can be reached from q0 by reading over u ∈ Σ∗, i.e., δ(q0, u) = q. If q is
weakly M> then ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L and 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L.
weakly M⊥ then ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L and 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L.
weakly M+ then ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L and ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L.
weakly M× then 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw ∈ L and 6 ∃v ∈ Σ∗.∀w ∈ Σω.uvw 6∈ L.
The four truth values can be used in state-level optimizations of monitoring algorithms:
If a state is weakly positively (resp. negatively) monitorable, then a monitor object can be
safely removed when it enters this state, provided that only violation (resp. satisfaction)
handlers are specified, as no handler can be triggered.
If a state is weakly neutrally monitorable, then a monitor object must be preserved if it is
at this state as both satisfaction and violation can be detected after some continuations.
If a state is weakly non-monitorable, then a monitor object can be safely removed when
it enters this state as no verdict can be detected after any continuation.
Besides, a monitor object can also be removed when it enters a > state or a ⊥ state, as any
finite or infinite continuation yields the same verdict.
Let us consider the relationship between the language-level monitorability and the
state-level weak monitorability. The following lemma shows that the monitorability of an
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ω-language depends on the weak monitorability of all the reachable states of its monitor.
This means, if an ω-language is non-monitorable, then the state space of its monitor may
consist of both weakly monitorable and weakly non-monitorable states.
I Lemma 18. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. L is monitorable iff every reachable state of M is weakly monitorable.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose L is monitorable. By Definition 4, ∀u ∈ Σ∗, ∃v ∈ Σ∗, s.t. uv is a good or
bad prefix. By Definition 7, this means ∀u ∈ Σ∗. ∃v ∈ Σ∗. [uv |= L]6 = > ∨ [uv |= L]6 = ⊥.
By Lemma 12, we have ∀u ∈ Σ∗. ∃v ∈ Σ∗. λ(δ(q0, uv)) = > ∨ λ(δ(q0, uv)) = ⊥. Let
δ(q0, u) = q. It follows ∀u ∈ Σ∗. δ(q0, u) = q ∧ ∃v ∈ Σ∗. λ(δ(q, v)) = > ∨ λ(δ(q, v)) = ⊥.
That is, for every reachable state q, a > state or a ⊥ state is reachable from q. Thus every
reachable state of M is weakly monitorable by Definition 16.
(⇐) This implication follows by the converse of the above reasoning. J
Let us consider how one can compute the state-level four-valued weak monitorability
for each state in a six-valued monitor. We first formalize a mapping from truth values to
weak monitorability, and then show that the state-level weak monitorability can be quickly
computed from the output of the state.
I Definition 19 (Value-to-weak-monitorability). Let vtom : B6 7→ M4 be the value-to-weak-
monitorability operator that converts a truth value in B6 into the corresponding result of weak
monitorability in M4 = {M>,M⊥,M+,M×}, defined as follows: vtom(>) = vtom(∓) = M>,
vtom(⊥) = vtom(±) = M⊥, vtom(+) = M+ and vtom(×) = M×.
I Theorem 20. Let M = (Q, Σ, δ, q0, B6, λ) be a six-valued monitor for an ω-language
L ⊆ Σω. The four-valued weak monitorability of q ∈ Q equals vtom(λ(q)).
Proof. On the one hand, consider all possible values of λ(q) in B6. For each possible value,
we can find the corresponding type of prefixes reaching q by Theorem 13. We know whether
these prefixes can be extended to good and bad prefixes, i.e., to reach > and ⊥ states, again
by Theorem 13. Thus the four-valued weak monitorability of q can be inferred by Definition
16. On the other hand, vtom(λ(q)) can be computed by Definition 19. It is easy to validate
that they are always equal. J
6 Implementation and experimental results
We have developed a new tool,Monic, that implements the proposed procedure for computing
four-valued monitorability of LTL formulas. Monic also supports deciding two-valued
monitorability. We have evaluated its effectiveness using a set of LTL formulas, including
formulas φ1 to φ6 (used in Section 1) and Dwyer et al.’s 97 LTL patterns [18, 10]. The
evaluation was performed on an ordinary laptop, equipped with an Intel Core i7-6500U CPU
(at 2.5GHz), 4GB RAM and Ubuntu Desktop (64-bit).
The result on formulas φ1 to φ6 shows that: φ1 is neutrally monitorable, φ2 is non-
monitorable, φ3 is positively monitorable, φ4 is negatively monitorable, φ5 is neutrally
monitorable, and φ6 is non-monitorable (but weakly monitorable). Thus, the violation of φ3
and the satisfaction of φ4 can never be detected, whereas both verdicts are active for φ1 and
φ5. Further, φ4 and φ5 can be discriminated by their different monitorability results.
We also ran Monic on Dwyer et al.’s specification patterns [18, 10], of which 97 are
well-formed LTL formulas. The result shows that 55 formulas are monitorable and 42 are
non-monitorable. For those monitorable ones, 6 are positively monitorable, 40 are negatively
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monitorable and 9 are neutrally monitorable. Our result disagrees with the two-valued result
reported in [10] only on the 6th LTL formula listed in the Appendix of [10]. More precisely,
Monic reports negatively monitorable, whereas the result in [10] is non-monitorable. The
formula is as follows (! for ¬, & for ∧, | for ∨, -> for →, U for U, <> for F, [] for G):
[](("call" & <>"open") ->
((!"atfloor" & !"open") U
("open" | (("atfloor" & !"open") U
("open" | ((!"atfloor" & !"open") U
("open" | (("atfloor" & !"open") U
("open" | (!"atfloor" U "open"))))))))))
The result in [10] is unreliable as it is based on manual inspection of monitors and no tool
is implemented in that work. To validate, a manual inspection of its monitor (in Figure 4)
shows that our result is correct. Indeed, state F is a ⊥ state, and states N1 to N7 are all ±
states that can reach the ⊥ state F.
N1
!call | open
N3
atfloor & call & !open
N2
!atfloor & call & !open
open
atfloor & !open
N4
!atfloor & !open
open
atfloor & !open
!atfloor & !open
open
!atfloor & !open
N5
atfloor & !open
open
atfloor & !open
N6
!atfloor & !open
open
!atfloor & !open
N7atfloor & !open
!open
Fopen
true
Figure 4 The monitor of an LTL pattern.
Finally, the above results for φ1 to φ6 and the 97 LTL patterns were computed in 0.03
and 0.07 seconds, with 16MB and 20MB memory consumed, respectively (all reported by
GNU time). To conclude, the results show that Monic can correctly report both two-valued
and four-valued monitorability of typical formulas in very little time.
7 Related work
Monitorability is a principal foundational question in RV because it delineates which properties
can be monitored at runtime. The classical results on monitorability have been established
for ω-languages, especially for LTL [37, 10, 7]. Francalanza and Aceto et al. have studied
monitorability for the Hennessy-Milner logic with recursion, both with a branching-time
semantics [21, 22, 23, 1] and with a linear-time semantics [2]. There exist some variants
of monitorability as well. For example, monitorability has been considered over unreliable
communication channels which may reorder or lose events [30]. However, all of the existing
works only consider two-valued notions of monitorability at the language-level.
Monitorability has been studied in other contexts. For example, a topological view-
point [16] and the correspondence between monitorability and the classifications of properties
(e.g., the safety-progress and safety-liveness classifications) [19, 20, 35] have been established.
A hierarchy of monitorability definitions (including monitorability and weak monitorabil-
ity [14]) has been defined wrt. the operational guarantees provided by monitors [3].
A four-valued semantics for LTL [8, 9] has been proposed to refine the three-valued
semantics [10]. It divides the inconclusive truth value ? into two values: currently true and
currently false, i.e., whether the finite sequence observed so far satisfies the property based
on a finite semantics for LTL. Note that it provides more information on what has already
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been seen, whereas our six-valued semantics describes what verdicts can be detected in the
future continuation.
8 Conclusion
We have proposed four-valued monitorability and the corresponding computation procedure
for ω-regular languages. Then we applied the four-valued notion at the state-level. To
our knowledge, this is the first study of multi-valued monitorability, inspired by practical
requirements from RV. We believe that our work and implementation can be integrated into
RV tools to provide information at the development stage and thus avoid the development of
unnecessary handlers and the use of monitoring that cannot add value, enhance property
debugging, and enable state-level optimizations of monitoring algorithms.
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